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One of the things I have noticed about Brexit is the extent to which it 
appears to have promoted introspection amongst the relevant parties. 
Here in the UK, this is manifested in domestic politics, with a furious 
to-and-fro between those who get labelled as “Brexiters” and those 
labelled “Remainers”. 
In the EU (and, indeed, elsewhere in Europe), Brexit is mercifully a 
rather less divisive topic. “It is what it is”, so to speak. However, that 
does not preclude some strongly held opinions on the subject. 
In both cases (the UK and the EU), there tends to be a focus on the 
short-term and a rather partial view of what the benefits or costs of 
any decision might be. In economic terms, this is rather like 
considering a partial equilibrium solution to a problem rather than 
considering it in its totality. 
Something missing from both sides has been an appreciation of the 
issues and domestic challenges facing the other. In this blog, I’d like 
to try and redress this balance a tiny bit. 
The broad thrust of the EU position is straightforward. In spite of the 
protestations of some, it is not the nefarious action of some actor with 
state-like ambitions. Instead, there are two or three key factors to 
consider. 
Firstly, Brexit isn’t that important to the EU. As individuals, all of us 
have a tendency to consider ourselves the centre of the known 
universe. For better or for worse, we assume that others are looking 
at us. Yet in actuality, we are unimportant to them. When I’m out-and-
about, very few will give me a second glance. Why should they? What 
practical relevance do I have to their lives? The same is true of Brexit. 
The whole of Europe is dealing with a pathogen that has turned our 
world upside down. We are simultaneously desperately trying to 
salvage what economic activity we can, whilst mitigating job losses 
and trying to avoid excess deaths. So far, we’ve done a fairly poor job 
compared to East Asia. 
Then, we must consider the relevant actors. For those internal to the 
EU itself (whether employed by the EU or directly committed to its 
institutions), there are existential issues at play. Irrespective of reality, 
it must not be the case that the UK is seen to have got “a better deal” 
out of leaving the EU. Otherwise, what would be the incentive to 
maintain the organisation? 
The other set of actors are the nation states that actually have 
decision-making power. For these, there are a host of competing 
issues at play. Naturally, domestic political interests are always at the 
fore – just as they are for the UK. 
As such, there is pressure to obtain short-term advantage in various 
areas that can be trumpeted. Likewise, there is pressure to appease 
domestic interests – whether that is the French fishing industry, the 
automotive sector, Spanish views on Gibraltar or anyone else. The 
UK faces exactly the same set of pressures, although they operate 
differently in every locale. 
However, I believe that the EU should look to take a longer term 
perspective. For the UK (including many in government), Brexit has 
become a totemic political issue. As a result, UK domestic discussion 
of any future relationship tends to descend into argument and the 
country is entirely focussed on the present negotiations. 
So it falls to the EU to think strategically about the future and to do so 
in a cold, sober manner that avoids the emotions that have become 
bound up in the subject. The first challenge is something that has 
become obvious over the course of negotiations: the renewed growth 
of mercantilism. 
Naturally, this has been clear on the British side (albeit wrapped up in 
a label of sovereignty). Ultimately, however, it is precisely this that 
underlies the problematic arguments around industrial subsidies, state 
aid and any “level playing field”. 
However, it is also quite obvious amongst many EU member states. 
We see this in the refusal to grant generous terms around cumulation 
(particularly in the automotive sector). We see it in the bizarrely high 
tariffs applied to agricultural products. We also see it in the desire to 
use equivalence as a political tool (rather than a less opaque and 
more generous system). 
This is not in the interests of the EU. Economic theory and most of the 
evidence we see is clear on this point: freer trade 
benefits both parties[1]. This applies to all of the EU’s trading 
relations, of course – the UK is one of many. 
However, the UK is an unusually large and proximate partner. 
Moreover, as a member state, it has typically been more sceptical of 
mercantilist instincts than many other member states. The loss of that 
voice bodes ill for all of us. 
So what should we do? Whilst the UK continues to eat itself alive 
engaged in bitter argument, the EU will need to think strategically (if 
not necessarily publically). Brexit will entail an economic hit to all of 
us. How can the EU create a structure that facilitates a closer 
economic relationship and mitigates that hit? If not now (due to 
political reasons) then at least there needs to be an understanding of 
how we get there. How can we best work towards eradicating the 
barriers that are currently being put in place in order to benefit all of 
us? 
 
[1] There are notable exceptions to this, but it is difficult to see how 
they apply in the context of the current negotiations. High tariffs on 
agricultural products are certainly a net negative and evidence 
suggests that insofar as service sector activity covered by passporting 
is concentrated, there are some benefits to efficiency. Again, we are 
all worse off if we lose this. As for automotive, it is hardly an infant 
industry and we are probably all better off maximising the efficiency of 
the European sector (minimising barriers). 
 
